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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY RESOLUTIONS
Scott Hirst*

Shareholders exert significant influence on the social and
environmental behavior of U.S. corporations through their votes on
social responsibility resolutions. However, the outcomes of many
social responsibility resolutions are distorted, because the largest
shareholders – institutional investors, such as mutual funds and
pension funds – often do not follow the interests or the preferences
of their own investors. This paper presents evidence that
institutions with similar investors and identical fiduciary duties vote
very differently on social responsibility resolutions, suggesting that
some institutional votes distort the interests of their investors. Other
evidence presented suggests that institutional votes on social
responsibility resolutions vary significantly from the preferences of
their own investors. Whether such distortion of preferences is a
problem is an open question. If such distortion is considered to be a
problem, it could be addressed by institutions changing their voting
policies on social responsibility resolutions to better approximate the
preferences of their investors. The stakes are high: eliminating
distortion could significantly influence the behavior of corporations
on social and environmental matters in a way that investors, and
society, would prefer.
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Introduction
Shareholders exert significant influence on the social and environmental
behavior of U.S. corporations. Shareholders vote on social and
environmental resolutions, which I refer to as ‘social responsibility
resolutions,’ that are put forward at corporations. The success or failure of
social responsibility resolutions influences the social and environmental
behavior of those corporations. The largest shareholders are institutional
investors – mutual funds, investment advisers and pension funds. When
they vote on social responsibility resolutions, they do so as fiduciaries for
their own investors. This article considers two questions: Do the votes of
institutions on social responsibility resolutions follow the interests of their
own investors? And do the votes of institutions on social responsibility
resolutions follow the preferences of their own investors? The article puts
forward evidence that they do not, and considers whether this is a problem,
and how it could be addressed. The stakes are high: if institutional investors
voted on social responsibility proposals as their own investors preferred,
corporate behavior on social and environmental matters might be much
closer to what investors, and society, would prefer.

1
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Voting has long been recognized as one of the primary rights of
shareholders.1 Shareholders vote to elect the board of directors of the
corporation, as well as on fundamental corporate transactions and changes
to the corporate charter.2 Shareholders can also vote on precatory
resolutions put forward by other shareholders, including those included in
the corporation’s proxy statement by shareholder proposals, as required by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.3 This article focuses on social
responsibility resolutions, those requesting that corporations take certain
actions on social and environmental matters.
If a sole investor or a small group of investors held shares in a
corporation directly, they could coordinate and vote to cause the board of
directors to act in their preferred manner. However, the number of investors
in U.S. public corporations is very large, making coordinated action
difficult. Some of these investors own shares in corporations directly, but
the overwhelming majority invest through institutional investors – mutual
funds, investment advisers and pension funds. Each of these institutions
invests in corporations as a fiduciary on behalf of these investors. Because
these investors invest through intermediaries that make voting decisions on
their behalves, there is a possibility that the voting decisions may not reflect
their interests, or their preferences. In examining this issue, this article
focuses on voting by mutual funds, not only because mutual funds hold the
largest proportion of equity of U.S. corporations, but also because they are
the only type of institution for which voting data is widely available. The
1

See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.Ch.1988) (“The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.”); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996)
(“[T]he stockholders control their own destiny through informed voting. This is
the highest and best form of corporate democracy.”)
2
For a discussion of shareholder voting on charter amendments, see Scott Hirst,
Frozen Charters, 34 Yale J. Reg. (2017), forthcoming; Harvard Law School
Program on Corporate Governance Working Paper 2016-01, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2729699.
3
See Rule 14a-8 “Shareholder Proposals,” promulgated pursuant to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8. Shareholder proposals
submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8 contain “recommendation or requirement that
the company and/or its board of directors take action” (ibid.). These
recommendations or requirements are presented as resolutions that shareholders
vote upon at the corporation’s meeting. The terms ‘proposal’ and ‘resolution’ are
often used interchangably; I will generally use the term ‘resolution.’
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fiduciary duties of mutual fund directors and investment advisers are
generally interpreted as requiring them to vote on resolutions at portfolio
corporations, in the best interests of their investors.4
A consideration of the voting records of mutual funds suggests that the
way some mutual funds vote on social responsibility resolutions may
represent a distortion of either the interests or the preferences of their
investors. First, votes of different mutual funds on social responsibility
resolutions diverge widely, even among mutual funds that are likely to have
very similar investors with very similar interests. If there is a way to vote on
these resolutions that reflects the best interests of these investors, some
mutuals funds appear to be voting wrongly on many resolutions. Second,
this article provides evidence that the way that many mutual funds vote on
resolutions may differ from the views of a majority of their own investors.
Because funds vote ‘all-or-nothing’ for, against or abstain, even where funds
vote the way a majority of their investors are likely to prefer, there will be a
divergence from the preferences of a minority of their investors.
Even if this is the case, does it matter that mutual fund votes may not
follow the preferences of their investors? This is open to debate. If mutual
funds can determine better than their own investors what is in the interests
of those investors, then this distortion may be optimal. Alternatively, if
corporations can determine for themselves the actions that will maximize
value on the matters being considered, then the preferences of investors
may be irrelevant. However, if it is considered valuable for corporations to
follow the wishes of their investors, then these distortions may represent a
significant problem, as they result in corporations being less likely to act as
their ultimate investors would prefer. Many resolutions requesting action
on environmental and social matters may fail where investors would prefer
that they pass. Corporations are less likely to take requested actions where
resolutions fail. And proponents are less likely to bring resolutions at other
4

See, e.g., Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of Labor, to Robert Monks, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.,
January 23, 1990 at 3 (reprinted at 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 244) (“The fiduciary
act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting
of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”) While this opinion only applies
to investment advisers to ERISA pension plans, since these are the same advisers
that advise mutual funds its effect has been that investment advisers to mutual
funds routinely vote the shares of those mutual funds.
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corporations, or bring other kinds of resolutions, given that such resolutions
attract less support than they otherwise would. Public officials that consider
the results of resolutions as a proxy for investor preferences on these
matters will receive distorted information, and may be less likely to take
action themselves.
This article does not attempt to offer a conclusion regarding whether
distortion constitutes a problem, or even whether it is taking place.
However, in the event that distortion is taking place and is considered a
problem, the article considers the alternatives for resolving the problem.
One possible solution is for investors to choose mutual funds that vote in
the ways that they prefer. This already takes place to limited extent when
investors invest in ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI) funds. However,
SRI funds represent a small percentage of aggregate funds invested, and
there are significant impediments to widespread sorting among mutual
funds, including very limited investor access to the information necessary
to make such decisions. The alternative is for mutual funds to consider the
preferences of their investors when determining voting policies and
decisions. In order to represent investors with preferences representing a
minority of investment in the fund as well as those representing a majority,
mutual funds could adopt policies whereby they would split their vote in
proportions consistent with the preferences of their investors. Vote splitting
is currently rare, but as a practical matter it is likely to be relatively
straightforward for these well-resourced institutions.
The next step in this debate should be for further consideration of the
preferences of investors. The data used in this article to draw conclusions
about investor preferences is limited and imperfect; the investment industry
– with the encouragement of the Securities and Exchange Commission –
should undertake their own analysis to determine whether their voting
differs from how their investors would prefer, and whether this represents
a problem.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part I describes
the background to shareholder voting on social responsibility resolutions.
Section A considers the composition of ‘shareholders,’ and describes how
they are predominantly institutional investors – mutual funds, investment
managers and pension funds – that invest on behalf of U.S. households, the
ultimate investors in U.S. corporations. Section B considers shareholder
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voting, including the rules that apply to mutual fund voting, and the
resolutions that are voted on by shareholders. Part II provides empirical
evidence of mutual fund voting on social responsibility resolutions. Section
B highlights the divergence of voting among mutual funds, and the potential
issues this raises. Section C considers evidence of likely investor preferences
to draw conclusions about how mutual fund votes may not represent the
preferences of their investors, and Section D considers arguments whether
or not this distortion constitutes a problem. If distortion is considered to be
a problem, Part III examines two alternatives approaches for undistorting
shareholder voting, and explains how this may have a significant impact on
the social and environmental behavior of U.S. corporations.

I. Shareholder Voting &
Social Responsibility Resolutions
A. Shareholders
Although some proportion of the equity of public corporations is owned
by individuals and households directly or through brokers, the significant
majority of equity of most corporations is beneficially owned by institutional
investors – mutual funds, investment advisers and pension funds. Each of
these institutions are fiduciaries for their own beneficiaries. According to
the U.S. Federal Reserve’s quarterly accounts as of the end of 2014, of
approximately $29.8 trillion in equity of U.S. corporations, 35% was owned
directly by households and non-profit organizations; 14% was owned by
pension funds (split approximately equally between public and private
pension funds); 24% was held by mutual funds, 6% by insurance companies,
and 20% was held by foreign investors.5

5

See Federal Reserve, Account L.213 Corporate Equities, Z.1 Flow of Funds
memorandum, March 12, 2015, at 119. The remainder was held by other financial
institutions, and government (excluding public pension funds). Because the value
for households is calculated as the residual left after other owners of corporate
equity are determined, and because the Federal Reserve’s accounting is
insufficiently granular to pick up certain kinds of institutional investors – e.g.,
hedge funds – these numbers likely understate the ownership of corporate equity
by institutions. See Federal Reserve Bank, Description of Table L.101 - Households
and Nonprofit Organizations, available at https://perma.cc/BAX2-RDZG.

5

Social Responsibility Resolutions
The beneficiaries of institutional investors are U.S. households. In the
case of defined benefit pension plans, they are past and future retirees. In
the case of mutual funds and investment advisers, although a significant
proportion – 25% of mutual funds and investment advisers6 – is held by
public pension funds, the majority is held by individuals who purchase
directly (‘retail’ investors) or through individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), and many more that purchase through their defined contribution
plans, often referred to as ‘401(k)’ plans.7
This article focuses on voting by mutual funds, because mutual funds
own the largest proportion of U.S. equity, and because – as discussed below
– mutual funds are the only type of institution generally required to disclose
their votes. The structure of mutual fund holdings, through shares or units,
also makes it easy to identify the proportion of the fund that is held for
particular beneficiaries. It is not possible to do the same for beneficiaries of
defined benefit plans, which contain a mix of vested interests for employees
that have retired, and unvested interests for employees that have not yet
retired, the value of which cannot be ascertained. However, similar issues
of distortion of beneficiary preferences as discussed below are likely to arise
for defined contribution plans as well, and similar arguments could be
applied.
B. Shareholder Voting
As the beneficial owners of shares in corporations, mutual funds
generally have the right to direct the votes8 associated with those shares on

6

Calculated from Federal Reserve, Account L.214 Mutual Fund Shares, Z.1
Flow of Funds memorandum, March 12, 2015, at 119.
7
See Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), 26 U.S. Code §
401(k). 401(k) plans are defined contribution plans sponsored by corporations.
Similar defined contribution plans administered by tax-exempt organizations, are
governed by Section 403(b) of the I.R.C., 26 U.S. Code § 401(k). Defined
contribution plans sponsored by federal or state government are generally
governed by separate legislation – e.g., the Thrift Saving Plan for employees of the
U.S. Federal Government, or the New York State Voluntary Defined Contribution
Plan.
8
Technically, the right to vote associated with shares is held by the registered
owner of shares. The shares beneficially owned by institutional investors such as
mutual funds are held by custodians, which in turn hold the shares through a
clearing organization, the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC), which is the legal
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the matters that are put to a vote at those corporations. Each mutual fund is
organized as a corporation (predominantly in Maryland), or a trust
(predominantly Massachusetts business trusts or Delaware statutory
trusts).9 Directors or trustees have the responsibility to vote, but delegate
this responsibility – along with the management of the mutual fund – to
investment advisers, each of which advises many different mutual funds.
Although directors formally appoint the investment adviser, mutual funds
are generally established and organized by investment advisers, which not
only operate the funds, but also use the investment adviser’s name in the
naming and marketing of the fund. Each investment adviser generally
advises dozens or hundreds of funds. The group of funds advised by an
investment adviser is often referred to as a ‘fund complex’ or ‘fund family.’
Mutual funds are required to publicly disclose the policies and
procedures by which they determine how to vote the shares owned by the
mutual fund,10 and to publicly disclose how the fund voted on each
resolution that was put to a vote at companies in which it owned shares, in
an SEC filing on Form N-PX.11 Investment advisers are also required to
disclose their proxy voting policies, and maintain records of their proxy

owner of shares in the corporation, and therefore exercises the legal right to vote.
The DTC does this by submitting an omnibus proxy, which aggregates voting
directions that it has received from custodians, which in turn received instructions
from the mutual funds and other institutions that beneficially own the shares held
by the custodian. For a comprehensive discussion of this process, see Marcel Kahan
& Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 Geo. L. J. (2008)
1227, 1243-1249.
9
Although the fiduciary duties of trustees under common law generally vary
significantly from those of directors, the Massachusetts and Delaware statutes
under which these trusts are established recognize that trustees of those trustees
owe duties akin to directors, rather than akin to trustees in general law. For the
position in Delaware, see Saminksy v Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528 (1961). For
Massachusetts, see the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Halebian v Berv, 457 Mass. 620 (2010). For parsimony, this article will refer to
‘directors’ of mutual funds, but the arguments made apply equally to mutual funds
organized as trusts that therefore have trustees rather than directors.
10
See Form N-1A prescribed under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(henceforth, the ‘1940 Act’), 17 C.F.R. 270.30b1-4 (requiring the disclosure of
proxy voting policies by mutual funds).
11
See Rule 30b1-4 of the 1940 Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. 270.30b1-4 (requiring the
disclosure of proxy voting records on Form N-PX).
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voting.12 Larger investment advisers have dedicated corporate governance
staff, who are responsible for the preparation and implementation of voting
policies. Smaller investment advisers may delegate the task of voting
according to each fund’s voting policies to an outside consultant or proxy
advisor. In each case, voting policies are approved by the board of directors
of the fund.
C. Social Responsibility Resolutions
The matters that mutual funds vote on – and therefore, the matters
covered by these policies – encompass all of the matters put to a vote at
public corporations: the election of directors, fundamental corporate
changes such as mergers, changes to the corporation’s charter, and
resolutions put forward by the directors or shareholders of the corporation.
Resolutions put forward by shareholders include social responsibility
resolutions – those related to environmental and social matters – as well as
governance matters. This article focuses on social responsibility resolutions,
as mutual fund voting on these matters is more likely to diverge from the
preferences of individual investors than voting on elections, mergers or
governance matters. Voting for directors and voting on mergers requires
considerable information about the company, its prospects and
management, which ultimate investors – households – are unlikely to have
knowledge of. Similarly, households are unlikely to have in-depth
knowledge about governance matters voted on a corporations, such as
whether the corporation’s compensation arrangements are value
enhancing, or whether the corporation should have a classified board or
annual elections. In contrast, the most common social responsibility
resolutions relate to political contributions and lobbying disclosure,
greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and sustainability. These are
topics that are part of the popular discourse, on which individual investors
are likely to have their own preferences, and their own views regarding
whether or not actions on these matters are likely to increase value. Table 1,
12

See Rule 204-2 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (henceforth, the ‘Advisers Act’), 17 C.F.R.
275.204-2 (requiring investment advisers to maintain proxy voting policies and
records). See also Rule 206(4)-6 of the Advisers Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-6
(exercising voting authority is a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act unless
voting policies are formulated and disclosed to clients).
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below, lists the most common types of social responsibility resolutions voted
on at annual meetings in 2014 (excluding categories with less than five
resolutions voted on), the number of resolutions voted on for each category,
and the average votes cast in favor of those resolutions as a percentage of
votes cast.13
Table 1: Results for Most Common Social Responsibility Resolutions, 2014
Resolutions

Environmental
Resolutions

Social
Resolutions

Type of Resolution

Percentage of votes cast

Voted

Passed

For

Against

Abstain

Political Contributions Disclosure

45

1

26%

61%

12%

Political Lobbying Disclosure

38

0

23%

66%

11%

Political Activities and Action

12

0

7%

88%

5%

Human Rights Risk Assessment

9

0

22%

66%

12%

Sexual Orientation Anti-bias Policy

6

0

35%

59%

6%

Anti-Social Resolution

7

0

3%

90%

7%

Green House Gas Emissions

20

0

21%

66%

13%

Report on Sustainability

13

0

25%

63%

13%

Climate Change

9

0

19%

68%

12%

Recycling

6

0

18%

74%

9%

Genetically Modified Organisms

6

0

5%

84%

11%

Table 1 shows that, of the most common social responsibility resolutions
in 2014, only one resolution passed,14 and that social responsibility

13

Data is derived from ISS’s Voting Analytics database. Note that there are
significantly more shareholder resolutions submitted than voted upon. If Rule 14a8 permits, certain resolutions may be omitted from proxy statements. A
corporation receiving a resolution may also reach agreement with the proponent to
withdraw the resolution. However, it can be difficult to find accurate figures for the
number of resolutions submitted. Requests for permission to exclude resolutions
are public. However, neither companies nor proponents are required to disclose
the number of resolutions that are withdrawn by agreement with corporations. As
a matter of practice, many of the organizations submitting such resolutions disclose
their resolutions, and these are collected by the organization As You Sow, but these
are likely to underestimate the true number of resolutions submitted.
14
That resolution was a resolution requesting that Smith & Wesson Holding
Corporation disclose its political contribution and lobbying expenditure. It
received 49.7% of votes cast, but 55.8% of the for/against votes, the standard on
which the company determines shareholder resolution success.
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resolutions receive relatively low levels of shareholder support,15 with the
most successful category receiving average support of 35% of votes cast.
The social responsibility resolution most frequently voted on in 2014
requested the disclosure of political contributions by the corporation. The
most common version of this type of resolution was based on a template
promulgated by the Center for Political Accountability, which takes the
following form:
Resolved, that the shareholders of [Company]
hereby request that the Company provide a report,
updated semi-annually, disclosing the Company’s:
1. Policies and procedures for making, with
corporate funds or assets, contributions and
expenditures (direct or indirect) to (a) participate
or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office,
or (b) influence the general public, or any segment
thereof, with respect to an election or referendum.
2. Monetary and non-monetary contributions and
expenditures (direct and indirect) used in the
manner described in section 1 above, including:
a. The identity of the recipient as well as the
amount paid to each; and
b. The title(s) of the person(s) in the Company
responsible for decision-making.
The report shall be presented to the board of
directors or relevant board committee and posted
on the Company’s website.16

15

The low rates of success in the resolutions that are voted on are likely to reflect
some level of selection bias. If a company believes a resolution is likely to pass, or
even to receive significant support, the company may reach an agreement with the
proponent to undertake all or some of the measures that the resolution requests, in
return for the proponent withdrawing the resolution.
16
See Center for Political Accountability, Political Disclosure and Oversight
Resolution 2013, available at http://perma.cc/AN8W-FYTA.
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Part II uses resolutions requesting disclosure of political contributions
like this one to consider how mutual fund votes may distort investor
interests and preferences.

II. Distortions in Social Responsibility
Resolutions
A. Voting on Social Responsibility Resolutions
How do mutual funds actually vote on resolutions requesting disclosure
of political spending? To consider this question, this section presents voting
data drawn from ISS’s Voting Analytics database, which is based on the data
released by mutual funds on Form N-PX, and includes data on 746
shareholder resolutions voted on at 326 companies at annual meetings
between July 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014. For those resolutions, the database
contains votes by 4,003 mutual funds in 236 fund families, with 295,441 total
fund-votes.
I assemble voting data on resolutions requesting disclosure of political
spending, and for comparison, those relating to greenhouse gas emissions,
the most frequently submitted environmental resolution in Table 1. For each
fund family with more than 10 votes on a particular resolution I determine
the proportion of the fund-votes in that family that were for, against and
abstain.
For each mutual fund family, I present the percentage of fund-votes in
favor, against and abstain on each type of resolution. Almost all funds in the
sample voted ‘all-or-nothing’ on each resolution17 – that is, the fund voted
all of its shares the same way on the resolution, either for, against, or abstain.
To illustrate, a 30% ‘for’ result for a fund family with 50 mutual funds that
voted on 20 resolutions of a particular type could mean that, of the fund
family’s 1,000 total fund-votes, 30 of the funds in the family voted all of

17

Of the 295,411 fund-votes in the data set, there were only 106 split votes
(0.04%), from 12 fund families, notably from JPMorgan Asset Management, which
split 33 fund-votes, Leader Capital 19, John Hancock 16, and Wilshire Associates
14. The voting policy of JPMorgan Asset Management suggests that it likely split
votes because one or more of the funds’ portfolio managers had a different opinion
on the resolution’s value than the fund’s overall voting decision.
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their shares in 10 companies in favor of the resolution, or all 50 of the funds
in the family voted all their shares in 6 companies in favor of the resolution.
Figure 1, below, presents data for votes by the largest 30 fund families18
on political spending disclosure resolutions, in decreasing order of the
percentage of fund-votes in favor. Funds with less than 100 fund-votes are
excluded. Black denotes the proportion of fund-votes in favor, gray the
proportion against, and white the proportion of fund-votes to abstain. The
data are also presented in tabular form in Table A.1 in the Appendix,
together with the corresponding data ranked by fund family size.
Figure 1: Largest Mutual Fund Family Voting on Resolutions regarding
Political Spending Disclosure
Deutsche
MFS
SEI
Mainstay
Morgan Stanley
Wells Fargo
Columbia Funds
John Hancock
Charles Schwab
Legg Mason
Janus
State Street
Allianz
AXA
TIAA
Invesco Funds
Prudential
Goldman Sachs
Northern Trust
Federated Investors
Fidelity
Jackson National
Capital Group
JPMorgan
T Rowe Price
BlackRock
Vanguard
Dimensional
Dreyfus
Putnam

The funds in Figure 1 voted, on average 27.6% ‘for’ and 55.4% ‘against’
(weighted by the number of fund votes in the family). For comparison
purposes, Figure 2, below, present corresponding results for resolutions
regarding greenhouse gas emissions disclosure (the corresponding averages
are 27.2% ‘for’ and 58.6% ‘against’).

18

The largest funds are determined by the total net assets of the fund, derived
from the CRSP Mutual Funds database.
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Figure 2: Largest Mutual Fund Family Voting on Resolutions regarding
Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosure
Deutsche
TIAA
SEI
Wells Fargo
John Hancock
AXA
Allianz
Prudential
State Street
Invesco Funds
Dimensional
Dreyfus
Fidelity
Jackson National
T Rowe Price
JPMorgan
Columbia Funds
Vanguard
BlackRock
MFS
Charles Schwab
Putnam

B. Heterogeneity in Voting on Social Responsibility Resolutions
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that different fund families vote very
differently from one another on particular types of resolutions.19 For
example, on resolutions to disclose political spending, Deutsche Asset
Management voted 100% of its fund-votes in favor of such resolutions. Yet
Dreyfus, Putnam and Dimensional voted 100% of their fund-votes against
such resolutions. If there was likely to be significant variation in the
investors served by these different fund families, the variation might be
explained by the fund following the preferences of their investors. For
instance, if one of the institutions were a socially responsible investment
fund, it might attract particularly socially-minded investors, whose
preferences may differ from those mainstream mutual fund investors, which
might explain the different voting results. However, all of the funds included
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are all very large, mainstream mutual funds. Given
the size and number of investors in these mutual funds, the comparability of
their mutual fund offerings, and the robust competition in the mutual fund

19

This is consistent with empirical evidence on mutual fund voting in director
elections. See, e.g., Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Heterogeneity and peer
effects in mutual fund proxy voting, (2010) 98 J. Fin. Econ 90, 90 (“[M]utual
funds systematically differ in their voting behavior”).
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market,20 it is likely that there is a significant overlap between the types of
investors these funds cover. It is therefore likely that the views of ultimate
investors in the funds in Figure 1 and Figure 2 do not vary significantly from
one fund to another. As a result, the preferences of the ultimate investors in
these funds are unlikely to vary as much as the variation in the votes among
the funds. Funds that vote in radically different ways cannot all be right
about which vote would maximize shareholder value. And if those funds
have shareholders with similar preferences, at least some of the funds must
be voting in ways that do not match the preferences of their investors.
How can mutual funds vote so differently? Mutual funds directors, who
are ultimately responsible for fund voting, have a fiduciary duty to act in the
best interest of the mutual fund. Investment advisers, which advise on and
carry out fund votes, have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their
client, the mutual fund. The content of these duties is the same for all
mutual funds: to maximize the value of the fund, which means maximizing
the value of the portfolio companies that are subject to these resolutions. If
these fiduciaries have the same imperative, how can they vote for opposite
outcomes?
The only way to reconcile these conflicting actions is that different
mutual funds have different beliefs about the actions that are most likely to
increase the value of the company. This is possible because of the limited
evidence about the effects of different environmental and social actions by
corporations on value. For instance, consider the evidence regarding
disclosure of political contributions. Although there is a substantial
literature spread across a number of disciplines about corporate political
activity by corporations,21 only a small part of this deals with the value
20

See John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund
Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. Corp. L. 151, 153 (2007)
(“[P]rice competition is in fact a strong force constraining fund advisers”).
21
A number of review articles describe the extensive empirical literature on
corporate political activity, which includes political contributions, political
spending, lobbying, and political networks, and which also consider the effects of
corporate political activity on value. These include Brian Schaffer, Firm-level
Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches, (1995) 21
J. Mgmt. 495; Amy Hillman, Gerald Keim & Douglas Schuler, Corporate Political
Activity: A Review and Research Agenda, (2004) 30 J. Mgmt. 837; and Ike Mathur
& Manohar Singh, Corporate Political Strategies, (2011) 51 Acc. & Fin. 252. In
addition to these narrative reviews, Lux, Crook & Woehr conduct a meta-analysis
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effects of political contributions. Key parts of this question are underexplored, and the empirical evidence that has been produced provides
conflicting evidence of whether political spending increases or decreases
corporate value, and for which corporations and under what circumstances
it does so. This empirical evidence relating to the value effects of political
spending relates to spending that has been disclosed; the evidence on
whether disclosure of political spending increases or decreases corporate
value is very limited.22
Despite this paucity of evidence, mutual fund directors and investment
advisers are nonetheless forced to make decisions about which outcome on
each issue is most likely to maximize the value of the corporation. So it
should be no surprise that they make decisions based on factors other than
the evidence, and that those factors, and the consequent decisions, vary
widely. In some cases, there may be interests other than those of their clients
that could affect investment adviser decision making. Others have
suggested that mutual funds may have incentives to not to vote against the
preferences of managers of corporations, in order to improve their chances
of receiving plan administration business from those corporations.23
Investment advisers that are public companies may themselves be subject to
potential shareholder pressure on the same matters that they are voting on

of the evidence Sean Lux, T. Russell Crook & David Woehr, Mixing Business with
Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political
Activity, (2011) 37 J. Mgmt. 223, which concludes that corporate political activity
does increase corporate value.
22
For a recent paper considering the value effects of disclosure, see Saumya
Prabhat & David Primo, Risky Business: Does Disclosure and Shareholder
Approval of Corporate Political Contributions Affect Stock Volatility and Value?,
Unpublished working paper (Apr. 2016), available at https://perma.cc/5P5JYMK8.
23
See, e.g., Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund
Advisers to Advocate for Shareholder Rights, (2008-2009) 34 J. Corp. L. 843,
846(“the greater the dependency of the [a]dviser upon the [defined contribution]
channel for asset management business, the less likely the fund family will be to
support shareholder-sponsored governance resolutions”); Rasha Ashraf,
Narayanan Jayaraman, and Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related Business Ties
Inﬂuence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, (2012) 47 J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis 567, 567
(“Overall, our results suggest that pension-related business ties influence fund
families to vote with management at all firms.”).
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at their portfolio companies;24 voting in favor of change at a portfolio
company might invite suggestions that the investment adviser itself make
such a change.
C. Distortions in Social Responsibility Resolutions
How do mutual fund votes compare to the views of their own investors
on the issues they vote on? No public data exists showing the preferences of
the investors in particular mutual funds. However, since the ultimate
investors in mutual funds are U.S. households, and the largest mutual funds
represent millions of investors, the preferences of the investors in these
funds are likely to approach the preferences of American households more
generally. Mutual fund ownership is skewed towards wealthier and higher
income members of society.25 However, a rough sense of the preferences of
investors in mutual funds can be still gained by considering opinion polls of
the general population.
In an opinion poll conducted by Bannon Communications on behalf of
the Corporate Reform Coalition in October 2012, 72% of respondents
favored or strongly favored a resolution that “shareholders in a company
approve all political spending before the money is spent,” an even stronger
position than requiring disclosure of political spending. 77% of respondents
favored or strongly favored a resolution that required corporations to
“publicly disclose political expenditures to other groups that spend money
on politics like the Chamber of Commerce.”26 The results, extracted in
Table A.2 of the Appendix, showed small and inconsistent variations among
the groups of respondents younger than 35, between 35 and 55, and older
than 55.
24

For instance, in 2016 shareholders of T. Rowe Price Group Inc. and Franklin
Resources, Inc. put forward shareholder resolutions requesting reports on climate
change. See T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. Proxy Statement on Form 14A, filed Mar.
18, 2016, 50; Franklin Resources, Inc. Proxy Statement on Form 14A, filed Jan. 8,
2016, at 53.
25
See, e.g., Eric N. Wolff, Who Owns Stock in American Corporations, 158(4)
Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. (2014) 372, 387.
26
The poll interviewed a randomly sample of 804 Americans aged 18 and over,
and had an estimated margin of error of 3.8%. See Bannon Communications
Research, Memo to Corporate Reform Coalition, Executive Summary, available at
http://perma.cc/57VS-6JMR. Additional detail on the survey is available at
http://perma.cc/BAJ8-4ZA2.
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Additional light is shed on the robustness of the results across different
groups by a poll conducted by SurveyUSA on behalf of People for the
American Way, in February 2010.27 One of the questions in the poll asked
“Should a publicly traded corporation get shareholder approval before the
corporation spends money to support or oppose a candidate for elected
office? Or, is shareholder approval not necessary?” 75% of respondents
responded that corporations should get shareholder approval, compared to
13% responding that approval was not necessary. Respondents aged 50 and
over were more likely to respond that approval was necessary than those
aged 18 to 49. Similarly, respondents with annual income over $50,000 were
more likely to respond that approval was necessary than those with annual
income less than $50,000. These results are extracted in Table A.3 of the
Appendix.
Obviously, these are imperfect estimates of the views of mutual fund
investors, for a multitude of reasons: the polls were not restricted to mutual
fund investors; there was no weighting by the number of mutual fund units
or shares owned; results were likely to be influenced by the framing and
wording of the questions posed (for instance, the questions did not mention
the potential cost of implementing the resolutions); and the polls were
commissioned by progressive organizations seeking to limit corporate
political activity. To further this debate, methodologically superior polling
of mutual fund investors should be conducted. The results of such polling
are likely to differ from those presented here. However, in the absence of
any other evidence, I will use these numbers to illustrate the ways in which
investor preferences can be distorted.
While some of the opinion poll questions asked about approval rather
than disclosure of political spending,28 I will assume – based on those poll
27

Survey conducted by SurveyUSA for People for the American Way, February
10, 2010, available at http://perma.cc/YPB9-QAFL. 1,200 American adults were
interviewed for the poll. The poll had a margin of error of 2.5%.
28
One of the questions in the Bannon Communications poll did ask about policies
requiring disclosure of political contributions to groups that spend money on
politics. The other question referred to in the Bannon Communications poll, and
the question referred to in the SurveyUSA poll, referred to policies requiring prior
approval for political spending, which are even more stringent (and therefore likely
to be less popular) than disclosure rules. The Bannon Communications numbers
were relatively consistent between the two questions, with greater support for the
disclosure resolution.
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results described above – that about 70% of mutual fund investors, weighted
by the value of their holdings, would be in favor of disclosure of political
spending by corporations. Comparing this assumption to the actual mutual
fund votes on political spending resolutions described in Figure 1 suggests
that most large mutual funds are likely voting against the preferences of a
majority of their investors on most resolutions of this nature. As discussed
above, Dreyfus, Putnam and Dimensional voted all of their shares against
every resolution requesting disclosure of political spending in 2014. In each
case, if 70% of the fund’s investors were in favor of the resolution, there was
a negative distortion of 70% from the vote in favor of the resolution that the
fund investors would have preferred.
Because mutual funds vote all of their shares in favor, against or abstain
on resolutions, even when funds vote in the way that a majority of their
investors would prefer, some distortion is inevitable. For instance,
Deutsche Asset Management voted 100% of their shares in favor of almost
all political spending disclosure resolutions. If only 70% of the fund’s
investors would have preferred that the fund vote in favor, and 30% would
have preferred that the fund vote against, then there was a positive
distortion of 30% in the vote in favor of each resolution, and a negative
distortion of 30% in the vote against each resolution. This distortion against
the preferences of the minority of investors is inevitable if funds vote all-ornothing: there will always be some proportion of fund investors that disagree
with the fund’s vote, and whose preferences are distorted through the
mutual fund’s voting.29
D. Should Fiduciaries Consider Investor Preferences?
Whether fiduciaries, such as those directing and advising mutual funds,
should consider the preferences of their investors is open to debate. This
can be seen as an application of one of the most central and longest-running
arguments in corporate law, regarding whether directors should act in what
they think are the best interests of shareholders, or what shareholders think

29

This assumes away the vanishingly unlikely possibility that all of a fund
family’s very large number of investors are unanimously in favor or against a
resolution.
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are in the best interests of shareholders.30 The aim of this article is not to
reach a conclusion on this question, but rather to put forward some
considerations about the question as it applies to shareholder resolutions,
and mutual fund voting on those resolutions.
Although fiduciary duties require mutual fund directors and investment
advisers to maximize the value of the fund, these duties are unlikely to
prevent mutual fund managers from considering investor preferences
except in the most extreme cases. To the extent investors prefer certain
actions because they believe that those actions will maximize the value of
the fund assets, or reduce the risk of an investment or the portfolio as a
whole, those actions could obviously be considered.31 Questions of whether
a fund manager can implement preferences that are likely to have no
material effect on fund value, or to reduce fund value, are much more
difficult.
Whether mutual funds should consider their investors’ preferences may
depend on the view taken of mutual fund managers, and of the managers of
their portfolio companies. If fund managers understand the likely effect of
certain actions on fund value much better than their investors, then
disregarding investors’ preferences will be in investors’ best interests.
Similarly, if managers of portfolio companies understand the likely effect of
corporate actions on the value of the corporation better than their
shareholders (including mutual funds), then for them to disregard precatory
resolutions will maximize firm value, and whether or not fund managers
consider their investors’ preferences in voting on those resolutions will be
irrelevant.
The existence of shareholder resolutions, and the fact that successful
shareholder resolutions influence the actions of directors, have implications
for this debate. If investor preferences were irrelevant, then the shareholder
resolution process, the sole aim of which is to express the preferences of
30

I am grateful to Ryan Bubb for discussions on this subject, and on some of the
ideas underlying this section more generally.
31
See, e.g., Department of Labor, Background to Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01,
29 C.F.R. 2509.2015-01, Fed. Reg. 65,135 (Oct. 26, 2015)(“Fiduciaries need not
treat commercially reasonable investments as inherently suspect or in need of
special scrutiny merely because they take into consideration environmental, social,
or other such factors.”) This applies only to fiduciaries and advisers for pension
plans, but demonstrates that such factors can clearly be considered by fiduciaries.
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shareholders for certain corporate actions, would also be irrelevant.
However, successful shareholder resolutions clearly have an impact on
corporate actions,32 suggesting that directors – who are fiduciaries for
shareholders – do believe that the preferences of those shareholders are
important.
That shareholder resolutions are implemented by directors also
highlights a flaw in the idea that directors always fulfil their fiduciary duty
to act in the best interests of the company. Consider a company where
directors always and only act in the best interests of the corporation, and
where a shareholder resolution to disclose political spending is being voted
on by shareholders. If directors believed that the measure was in the best
interests of the company they would have implemented it when they first
became aware of the possibility of such action – even if, for some reason,
they had not been previously aware of it, at the latest, when the shareholder
resolution was first put forward, obviating the need for a vote of
shareholders. Under this view, that the resolution goes to a vote means that
directors do not believe it is in the best interests of the corporation.
Therefore, even if it receives majority support, directors should not
implement it, as doing so would not be in the best interests of the
corporation.
A more direct version of this argument is the fact that mutual funds vote
on shareholder resolutions at portfolio companies, and express their
disapproval when directors do not respond to shareholder resolutions by
withholding votes from those directors’ own elections. These facts suggest

32

See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder proposals in the new
millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction, (2007) 13 J.
Corp. Fin. 368, 388 (“Increased shareholder voting support is positively
correlated with board action on the resolution”); Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers
Dismantle Staggered Boards, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 149, 152 (2008) (finding “a
statistically significant connection betwen precatory resolutions and the
management's decision to destagger”); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, Stephen R.
Stubben, Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder
proposals, (2010) 16 J. Corp. Fin. 53, 62 (“there is a signiﬁcantly positive
association between the likelihood of implementation and the percentage of ‘Votes
For’.”); Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The role of shareholder proposals in
corporate governance, (2011) 17 J. Corp. Fin. 167, 181 (“the higher the percentage
votes cast in favor, the higher the probability that a resolution is adopted”). I am
also grateful to Ryan Bubb for discussions of his work on this topic.

20

Social Responsibility Resolutions
that mutual funds believe that directors should consider the preferences of
their shareholders. If that weren’t the case, voting on resolutions, and voting
to withhold from unresponsive directors, would be a waste of the mutual
fund’s resources. That mutual fund directors believe that portfolio
company directors, as fiduciaries for their investors, should consider the
preference of those investors, would seem to be consistent with the view
that those mutual fund directors should consider the views of their own
investors.
Courts have also expressed views on the general question of directors
taking into account the preferences of shareholders, and the specific
question of mutual funds voting on shareholder resolutions. Delaware
courts have generally suggested that corporate directors are not required to
consider the preferences of their shareholders.33 However, such suggestions
have generally come in the context of whether directors could take actions
that they had reason to believe shareholders might disagree with.34 Federal
courts have affirmed the importance of shareholder preferences on social
and environmental matters as expressed in shareholder resolutions under
Rule 14a-8, and indicated that corporate managers should not replace the
preferences of their shareholders on such matters with managers’ own
preferences,35 and that taking into account shareholder preferences on such
33

See, e.g., the decision of then-Vice Chancellor Strine in In re Lear Corp.
S'holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del.Ch. 2008) (“Directors are not
thermometers, existing to register the ever-changing sentiments of stockholders.
… [D]irectors may take good faith actions that they believe will benefit
stockholders, even if they realize that the stockholders do not agree with them.”)
The decision also cited language that “a corporation is not a New England town
meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.” See TW
Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at 8 n. 14 (Del. Ch. 1989).)
34
For instance, Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision in In re Lear Corp. S'holder
Litig. (ibid.) related to whether directors could put forward a merger agreement for
stockholder approval if they believe that stockholders would benefit from its
adoption, even if they had some reason to believe that stockholders may prefer not
to approve it.
35
See, e.g., Medical C'ttee for Human Rights v. Sec. and Exchange Comm., 432
F.2d 659, 681 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (regarding whether the Dow Chemical Corporation
could exclude a shareholder resolution requesting that directors consider ceasing
production of napalm)(“It could scarcely be argued that management is more
qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders
who are the true beneficial owners of the corporation; and it seems equally
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matters does not conflict with managers’ need to apply its day-to-day
business judgment.36 In considering whether there is any conflict between
these positions, it should be noted that hundreds of Delaware corporations
have taken actions initially opposed by directors in response to successful
shareholder resolutions, without any challenge claiming such actions were
in breach of those directors’ fiduciary duties.

III. Undistorting Social Responsibility
Resolutions
Distortions in mutual fund voting may occur if the way mutual funds
vote does not match the preferences of mutual fund investors. If such
distortion is taking place, and is considered to be a problem, this definition
suggests two kinds of solutions: mutual fund investors could choose mutual
funds that vote the way they prefer, or mutual funds can change the way
they vote to match their investors’ preferences.
A. Investor Sorting by Mutual Fund Voting Policy
One solution is for investors to choose funds whose voting policies
match their preferences, and for current investors in funds whose voting
policies do not match their preferences to switch to another mutual fund.37
To a limited extent, such sorting already occurs. Some mutual funds
families, such as Calvert, are ‘socially responsible investment’ (SRI) funds
implausible that an application of the proxy rules which permitted such a result
could be harmonized with the philosophy of corporate democracy which Congress
embodied in section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”)
36
Medical C'ttee for Human Rights v. Sec. and Exchange Comm., ibid., (“…
there is a clear and compelling distinction between management's legitimate need
for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment, and
management's patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations
with their vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or
moral predilections.”)
37
I do not consider the possibility that mutual fund investors whose preferences
do not match the voting policy of their mutual fund should change their
preferences to match that voting policy. This suggests that investors would accept
that the mutual fund understands what is best for them better than they do
themselves. This would be plausible if they do not have preferences on a matter,
but not if they have preferences that they developed independently of the mutual
fund’s position on the matter.
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– they choose investments and vote their proxies in a way that they believe
serves social purposes, as well as maximizing returns or minimizing risk.
Other fund families that are not SRI funds may have one or more fund
families that are SRI funds – for instance, TIAA’s Social Choice Equity
Fund. SRI funds make up a growing proportion of the overall mutual fund
market. According to a report released by the U.S. S.I.F. Foundation, in
2014 there were 480 registered investment companies (including mutual
funds, variable annuities, exchange-traded funds and closed-end funds),
which collectively managed $1.9 trillion in assets. This reflects an ongoing
movement of investors towards these funds. A significant amount of this
investment may come from pension funds and non-profits. However, the
value of investments in these funds is still dwarfed by that in traditional
funds. If, as Part II suggests, a significant number of mutual fund investors
have preferences that are closer to the voting policies of SRI funds than
those of traditional investment advisers, why don’t more of those investors
choose to switch their investments from funds that do not vote as they
would prefer to funds that do? And why do new investors choose funds that
vote other than as they would prefer?38 That is, why is this problem not
solved by the mutual fund equivalent of the ‘Wall Street Walk,’ a kind of
‘Main Street Walk’? There are several potential reasons.
1. Informational problems. Investors in mainstream mutual funds are
likely to be unaware of the way their funds vote, and that those votes may
not be consistent with their own preferences.
Mutual funds disclose their voting policies, usually on their own
websites; however, these policies are difficult to compare and interpret.
Comparing voting policies among multiple funds requires considerable
effort. There is no central repository for voting policies from different fund
families. Policies are structured and worded very differently, making sideby-side comparisons difficult. Policies are often vague; on many matters
they indicate simply that the fund will vote on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, it is difficult for investors to get useful information about fund
voting records. Although each fund discloses its votes for the past year on
Form N-PX, the forms include every single resolution voted on at every

38

This section will focus on the existing investor aspect of the question, but will
apply the reasoning to new investors in Section A.4.
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single company in which the fund invests, so can be incredibly lengthy.39
Form N-PX provides no aggregation of voting by fund family or resolution
type of the kind presented in Part II, and it is unrealistic to expect individual
investors to perform such analysis. A number of non-profit organizations
that advocate on various issues consider mutual fund votes on the particular
issue of that interest them.40 However, there is currently no way for mutual
fund investors to gain a comprehensive view of the voting of the mutual
funds in which they invest or may wish to invest.
Reducing this information problem is possible, and may allow additional
sorting. For instance, the website proxydemocracy.org contains voting data
for a number of mutual funds on many social and environmental resolutions,
scraped from their Forms N-PX.41 However, while the site contains
comprehensive data from 2003 to 2010, data since that time is limited to
that provided by a small number of mutual funds that voluntarily provided
it to the site,42 because of resource constraints in gathering Forms N-PX on
an annual basis and administering the site. This demonstrates the collective
action nature of the information gathering problem – even though doing so
would be of value, the benefits are divided among very widely dispersed
mutual fund investors, each of whom may value the information only very
slightly, and insufficiently to pay for the costs of supplying that benefit and
the transaction costs of gathering the payment. This could be overcome by
the intervention of a non-profit organization, for instance one that that aims
to assist investors, or that aims to improve the choices of companies on some
of the social responsibility resolutions that would be more successful if

39

The Form N-PX filed by the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund for the
year ended June 30, 2014 is over 400 pages long.
40
For instance, the Center for Political Accountability produced annual reports
on mutual fund voting on political spending resolutions. See, e.g., Center for
Political Accountability, Corporate Political Spending and the
Mutual Fund Vote, November 2014, available at http://perma.cc/2EVZR4XT.
41
See Andy Eggers, “Alpha Version of our mutual fund vote database”, July 24,
2007, available at https://perma.cc/S8M5-XP4A.
42
See Proxy Democracy, “About… Data” available at https://perma.cc/SUM4SSRR.
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corporations voted as their investors preferred.43 It is possible that mutual
funds that believe that their voting policies compare favorably to their peers
may also be prepared to fund the collection and dissemination of such data,
as it would provide them with a marketing advantage.44
2. Insufficient options. Mutual fund voting policies represent a ‘bundle’
of voting preferences on different topics. Most funds in a fund family share
the same voting policies, so the number of bundles is limited by the number
of mutual fund families. It is therefore unlikely that every investor will be
able to find a bundle that perfectly matches their own preferences. This is
even more likely to be the case for investors that invest in mutual funds
through defined contribution plans, which are limited to a number of plan
choices chosen by the plan sponsor. Their options are even less likely to
include a fund whose voting matches their preferences.
3. Switching costs. Even if a fund with a sufficiently matching bundle
exists, there are likely to be costs associated for an investor to switch to it.
Most obviously, there may be commissions on trades in mutual fund shares.
Many mutual funds also charge penalties to discourage excess trading,
which take effect if the fund is sold before a certain period has elapsed.45
Switching costs will include the information costs of finding the fund that
sufficiently matches the preferences of the investor, and the burden of
comparing the fund on a diverse set of attributes. There may also be
behavioral obstacles to switching funds – Madrian and Shea observe a strong
‘inertia’ effect in employee 401(k) behavior.46 This may be exacerbated by
the significant amounts of information that it is necessary to process in order
to make an optimal decision.
Even if the costs associated with switching are not significant, they may
dominate the interest of the investor in switching. The extent to which a
rational investor cares about the way their mutual fund votes on a resolution
43

Indeed, there are signs that this may already be taking place. For instance, the
Sustainable Endowments Institute, a project of public charity Rockefeller
Philanthropy Advisors, has taken over the running of proxydemocracy.org.
44
This is a limited version of the argument further developed in Section B below.
45
In 2005, the SEC implemented a rule to cap mutual fund redemption fees at
2%. See SEC Final Rule: Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, March 11, 2005, 17 C.F.R.
Part 270, Release No. IC-26782.
46
See Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, Q. J. Econ. 116.4 (2001).
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at a particular corporation in which they hold a microscopic proportional
interest is likely to be similarly tiny. Even when aggregated across all the
issues at all the companies in which they are invested, the interests are likely
to still be very small, and to be dominated by switching costs, unless the
investor abides by very strong views on environmental and social matters.
However, even for other investors that care just a very small amount, these
preferences are not zero. When aggregated across the very large numbers of
investors, the aggregate value of the preference may be substantial.
4. New investors. Although this section has focused on reasons why the
Main Street Walk may not be effective for existing investors in mutual
funds, variations on the same arguments also apply to new investors. As
discussed above, such investors may not have available to them a sufficiently
variegated set of investment options that they can choose the right bundle.
In addition, these investors will also be burdened by information costs in
determining the mutual fund with the best bundle of policies. And their
preferences on the fund’s social and environmental voting are likely to be
dominated by the multiple other factors they are likely to consider in
choosing a retirement savings vehicle.
B. Voting According to Investor Preference
The alternative solution to investor sorting is for mutual funds to change
their voting policies to reflect the preferences of their investors. How should
a mutual fund ascertain the aggregate preferences of its large number of
investors? It would not be realistic for the fund to conduct a vote of its
ultimate investors each time a resolution is put forward at each of the many
companies it holds in its portfolio. Each poll would require costly
preparation, distribution and counting of ballots. And given the infinitesimal
proportional interest of each individual investor in each portfolio company,
and the even smaller likelihood of influencing the outcome of such votes, it
would not be worth any investor’s time to vote in such a poll.
However, since so many types of resolutions are similar, having
individual votes is not necessary. Instead, mutual funds could ascertain the
general preferences of their investors for each particular category of
resolution, in the same way funds currently have voting guidelines for
different categories of resolution. Funds would also not need to poll all of
their investors. Instead, they could use the kinds of sampling techniques
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employed by political polling and market research organizations to derive
accurate estimates (within percentage points) of voter or consumer
preferences from a relatively small number of respondents.47 If this variation
is randomly distributed across mutual funds, then the aggregate effect
across all mutual fund investors in a corporation will be zero. If this kind of
solution were to be adopted, economies of scale may lead to third parties
collectively polling for multiple mutual funds.48 This is similar to the
provision of proxy advisory services, and might be provided either by the
same organizations, or by new entrants, such as firms with existing expertise
in polling
As discussed in Part II, if a mutual fund votes its shares all-or-nothing,
some distortion is inevitable, against the minority preferences of investors.
This could be alleviated by proportional voting: the mutual fund could split
its vote, in the proportion that represents the fund’s best estimate of the
preferences of their investors. That is, if a fund’s polling led it to believe
that 70% of its investors, weighted by value of investment, would prefer the
fund to vote in favor of a particular resolution and 30% would prefer the fund
to vote against the resolution, then it would vote 70% of its shares in favor of
the resolution, and 30% of its shares against the resolution. Such
proportional voting is explicitly contemplated by the Department of Labor’s
1994 Interpretive Bulletin.49 A very small number of mutual funds already
47

For instance, the Bannon Communications and the SurveyUSA polls cited in
Part II claim sampling error of 3.8% and 2.5%, respectively. See notes 26 and 27,
supra.
48
It is possible that a fund might attempt to bias a survey in the direction the fund
considers optimal. This presupposes that a fund has a strong enough reason to
influence the outcome of the survey to outweigh the risk of trying to do so; it is not
clear that this would be the case. However, if this were seen as a likely possibility it
would increase the importance of having surveys conducted by a reputable third
party. If there were a significant concern about biased surveys, having a third party
conduct the survey could become a differentiating factor among funds
implementing proportional voting.
49
See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Written Statements of Investment Policy,
including Proxy Voting Policy or Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 29 C.F.R.
2509.94-2 (July 29, 1994), at 366 (“An investment manager of a pooled investment
vehicle that holds assets of more than one employee benefit plan may be subject to
a proxy voting policy of one plan that conflicts with the proxy voting policy of
another plan. Compliance with ERISA §404(a)(1)(D) would require such
investment manager to reconcile, insofar as possible, the conflicting policies …
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split votes – 0.04% of funds reporting on Form N-PX in 2014 recorded split
votes, making clear that such vote splitting is possible.50 Conversations with
the representative of an investment adviser responsible for implementing
the votes of a large mutual fund family confirmed that it would be relatively
straightforward for that mutual fund family to split their vote on shareholder
resolutions.51
If voting in accordance with investor preferences – either all-or-nothing
or proportionally – were considered a desirable solution, how might it be
achieved? A regulatory solution, through the SEC (applicable to all mutual
funds) or the Department of Labor (applicable to investment advisers and
other fiduciaries of ERISA pension plans), could require consideration of
investor preferences in voting. A judicial reinterpretation of fiduciary duties
of mutual funds or investment advisers could also require mutual fund
directors or investment advisers to consider of what investors consider to
be in their own best interests. However, some kind of regulatory or judicial
‘deus ex machina’ solution may not be necessary. Instead, it is possible that
voting in accordance with investor preferences may come about without
regulatory or judicial intervention (or that regulation might instead follow a
market trend towards proportional voting).
Mutual funds might adopt proportional voting as a defense to pressure
from public advocacy organization to vote in a particular way. If the
information problem discussed in Section A.1 were to be solved, non-profit
groups that advocate the implementation of certain environmental and
social policies by corporations, including those that regularly submit
shareholder resolutions on such topics, could use the data identify mutual
funds that vote against their investors’ likely preferences. Such advocacy
organizations could make the distortion clear to that mutual fund’s
investors within the organizations’ own networks, and to other investors or
potential investors in that fund with similar views, and suggest that investors
consider switching to a fund that votes in the manner the advocacy
and, if necessary and to the extent permitted by applicable law, vote the relevant
proxies to reflect such policies in proportion to each plan’s interest in the pooled
investment vehicle.”)
50
As discussed in note 17, supra, only 0.04% of fund-votes in 2014 were split
votes.
51
Email correspondence with a representative of a large mutual fund, May 5,
2016, on file with the author.
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organization prefers. Indeed, some precursors of this kind of campaign are
already being undertaken by certain advocacy organizations. For instance, a
group of advocacy organizations have recently begun a campaign to pressure
Vanguard to change its policy of voting against or abstaining on resolutions
relating to disclosure of political spending.52 If these campaigns were to
become more common and more successful, a fund may start voting in the
manner advocated by the organizations. However, to the extent the fund
votes all-or-nothing, there will still be a minority of investors whose
preferences the fund is voting against. To avoid this, a fund could adopt a
proportional voting policy. Adopting proportional voting could be done
preemptively, to prevent or deter such campaigns by advocacy
organizations, or defensively, in response to an explicit request by advocacy
organizations for the fund to vote in a particular way. Either way, the
explanation that the fund was voting in the interests of all of its investors
would provide an irreproachable answer to such advocacy.
If one mutual fund were to adopt proportional voting, whether in
response to outside pressure or of its own volition, it could then market itself
as better aligned with the preferences of investors than its competitors.53 As
discussed in Section A, there are various reasons why many investors may be
unlikely to switch between mutual funds. However, there are likely to be
some marginal investors who have particularly strong preferences on issues
on which there may be sufficient distortion that they might consider
switching. Pension funds that employ investment advisers could also use
their purchasing power to pressure investment advisers to adopt
proportional voting, not just for those pension funds’ investments, but for
all the adviser’s mutual fund products. At that point, proportional voting
could become an effective defensive measure for investment advisers and
mutual fund families. Because proportional voting would largely involve
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See, e.g., Eleanor Bloxham, Corporate Political Donations and Lobbying are Still
Trapped in a Murky, Dark Cloud, Fortune.com, Mar. 7, 2016, available at
https://perma.cc/5JVE-R5W6 (“over 65,000 members of Public Citizen, U.S.
PIRG, and Common Cause, among others, sent emails to Vanguard asking it to
change its voting policy guidelines to vote in favor of political spending
disclosure”).
53
For instance, SRI funds could easily start adopting a proportional voting
mechanism, and marketing it to potential investors – most likely ultimate investors
with strong social preferences, but possibly a broader group.

29

Social Responsibility Resolutions
fixed costs (establishing a polling infrastructure or paying an outside advisor
to undertake polling), for large mutual funds the per-investor cost of
implementing proportional voting would be very small. Given the breadth
of their investors, and the likely divergence of views amongst them, large
mutual funds may also benefit more from being able to represent the views
of all of their investors than smaller, more homogeneous funds. Since they
would no longer be taking voting positions that diverged from the majority
preferences, of their investors or even the minority preferences, their votes
would be defensible to all of their investors.
Long term demographic changes may strengthen the likelihood of a
move to voting according to investor preferences. Younger investors
entering the market for mutual fund products as they find employment and
start saving for retirement are likely to be more socially engaged than older
investors, and may be more likely to weigh their preferences on social and
environmental matters in making investment decisions, and the proportion
of the market represented by such investors represent will only increase.
C. The Impact of Undistorted Social Responsibility Resolutions
If steps were taken to reduce distortion in mutual fund voting, this may
have significant flow-on effects. As described in Part II, Because many
mutual funds currently vote against or abstain on shareholder resolutions
that a majority of their investors are likely to support, many resolutions
receive aggregate support substantially less than a majority of votes cast,
even though a majority of the ultimate investors of those corporations would
prefer that those resolutions pass. Were mutual funds to vote consistently
with the majority preferences of their investors, or proportionately with the
preferences of all of their investors, aggregate levels of support would
increase substantially, and many resolutions that currently receive less than
50% support would pass. Empirical evidence suggests that moves by certain
mutual funds to change their voting policy on certain shareholder
resolutions may influence their peer mutual funds to similarly change their
own policies.54

54

Matvos & Ostrovsky found that a fund is more likely to oppose management
when other funds are more likely to oppose it as well. See Matvos & Ostrovsky,
Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting, supra note 19, at 91.
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Increased passage of shareholder resolutions is likely to result in
increased implementation of the measures requested. Shareholder
resolutions are generally precatory, so directors of corporations where a
resolution passes may choose whether or not to implement the resolutions.
However, as discussed above, if a resolution passes, the company is more
likely to implement the action requested.55 In the same way that mutual
funds may choose to consider the views of their investors in determining
their voting policy, directors may be influenced to follow the preferences of
shareholders expressed through the vote. Because of other mutual fund
voting policies, and the policies of proxy advisory firms, directors that do
not implement shareholder resolutions that receive majority support may
have votes withheld from their own elections in subsequent years, which
may impact directors’ decisions to implement resolutions.56 A corporation
may be more likely to implement a requested action even if the resolution
did not pass, but received strong minority support, e.g., more than 40% of
votes cast. Many social responsibility resolutions that corporations believe
are likely to receive strong support result in negotiated agreements to
implement some measures requested in the resolution.57 Increasing the level
of voting support for these resolutions would mean that they are more likely
to result in negotiated agreements.
Reducing distortion and increasing the level of support for shareholder
resolutions is likely to have a dynamic effect on the number and type of
shareholder resolutions submitted. Proponents are more likely to submit
resolutions that are likely to receive greater support. Proponents that are
currently seeking change through other forms of action may devote more
resources to submitting shareholder resolutions if those resolutions become
more effective as a way to persuade corporations to make desired changes.
55

See note 32, supra.
See, e.g., Laurent Bach & Daniel Metzger, Why Do Shareholder Votes Matter?,
Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 13-01, August 2105 (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2247084), 2 (“If support for a resolution barely passes
50% of votes cast ‘for’ and ‘against’ (the CII threshold) and yet management does
not implement the resolution, then the number of votes against incumbent
directors in the next election increases significantly.”)
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For a discussion of settlements of resolutions relating to political spending, see
Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settelments and the Private Ordering of Public
Elections, 125 Yale L.J. (2016), forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2780592.
56

31

Social Responsibility Resolutions
This is likely to result not only in more of the types of resolutions that start
to receive greater support, but also the submission of new types of
resolutions, on topics which – even though they reflect the preferences of
investors – may not receive much support based on the current voting
policies of mutual funds. One potential limitation on submitting new types
of shareholder resolutions may be SEC rules allowing exclusion of
shareholder resolutions submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8 that relate to the
ordinary business of the corporation.58 However, since 1970, the SEC has
allowed shareholder resolutions on environmental and social matters that it
considered of sufficient social importance.59 That resolutions are likely to
receive greater support may be evidence that investors consider them to be
important.
The above scenario represents private ordering by corporations on
issues of social and environmental importance, initiated by shareholder
resolutions and supported by mutual funds and other institutional investors
voting in a manner guided by investor preferences. On many social and
environmental matters that are put to shareholders for a vote, it may be
preferable for rules to be set for the industry or economy as a whole, by
legislation, regulation or judicial action. For instance, on political spending,
legislation or regulation requiring disclosure of political spending may be
preferable to policies that apply at individual companies. It is clearly the case
that, with respect to many problems, company private ordering will be
inferior to mandatory rules. Where a policy should apply across a large
group of companies, implementing it one company at a time will be
duplicative and expensive. There may be ‘first-mover’ disadvantages
whereby particular companies that adopt the rule before other companies
suffer disproportional costs. There may also be distortions from public
corporations becoming subject to rules through private ordering that
privately held corporations and other types of business entity are not subject
to. In addition, because the distribution of popular ownership of
corporations over-represents wealthier and higher income households,
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17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(7). For a comprehensive discussion the SEC’s ordinary
business exclusion, see Reilly S. Steel, The Underground Rulification of the Ordinary
Business Operations Exclusion (Mar. 23, 2016), 116 Colum. L. Rev. (2016),
forthcoming. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2752591.
59
Medical C'ttee for Human Rights v. Sec. and Exchange Comm., supra note 35.
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decisions made through shareholder voting may be less reflective of social
welfare than decisions made through more broadly democratic bodies, and
therefore likely to be only a second-best solution. However, corporate
private ordering would not be necessary if there were legislative or
regulatory action on these matters. Where there is no such action, the
second-best solution may be the best available solution.
The greater submission and success of shareholder resolutions, and the
implementation of shareholder-proposed changes by corporations, may also
inform the views of regulators, legislators and jurists on those matters. That
more resolutions succeed makes clear that investors prefer the changes
proposed, and the implementation of proposed changes makes clear that
directors of corporations may also agree that those actions are in the best
interests of the corporation. Implementation also allows other corporations
and commentators to see that proposed actions can be made without certain
potential negative effects that they might fear. As a result, successful
resolutions can lead to broader adoption, and in some cases, to regulation.
To a significant extent, the strong support for shareholder resolutions
requesting ‘say-on-pay’ votes, and the success of those resolutions in
persuading corporations to adopt say-on-pay votes, paved the way for the
mandatory say-on-pay rules included in the Dodd-Frank Act.60

Conclusion
This article began by considering the relationship between voting by
institutional investors on social responsibility resolutions, and the interests
and preferences of their own investors on social and environmental matters.
Evidence from mutual fund voting on social responsibility resolutions raises
several questions.
First, why do mutual funds with similar investors, and identical
fiduciary duties, vote very differently on social responsibility resolutions?
This suggests that at some mutual funds are not voting in the best interests
of their investors.
Second, is there a distortion between how mutual funds vote, and what
their investors would prefer? The data this article uses for investor
60

The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
§951, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010).
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preferences is necessarily limited and imperfect; as an initial step to
examining some of these questions, mutual funds – with the encouragement
of the SEC – should undertake their own analyses to determine the
preferences of their investors, and whether there is indeed a distortion
between those preferences and their own voting policies.
Third, is distortion between mutual fund votes and investors
preferences undesirable? Indeed, should mutual funds consider the
preferences of their investors at all? The article considers both sides of this
question, and does not attempt to reach a conclusion, although it suggests
some reasons why considering investor preferences is more consistent with
the existing proxy voting system.
Finally, if distortions in mutual fund voting are undesirable, how might
they be eliminated? A prerequisite for eliminating distortion is information
about mutual fund voting that would allow investors, potential investors,
mutual funds and third parties to compare the voting records of different
mutual fund families. Having such information available may increase the
possibility of investor selection based on preferences, but this is, at best, a
partial solution. More effective would be changes in mutual fund voting to
reflect investor preferences, such as proportional voting.
The stakes for these questions are high: changing mutual fund voting on
social responsibility resolutions could significantly influence corporate
behavior on social and environmental matters in a way that investors, and
society, would prefer.
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Appendix: Social Responsibility Resolution
Voting and Poll Data
Table A.1: Mutual Family Fund Voting on Political Spending Resolutions,
2014
. Fund Families, by For / Ag.

For / Ag.

1. Deutsche (Fund-votes: 278)

100 / 0

. Fund Families, by Size

For / Ag.

1. Vanguard (Fund-votes: 1,028)

0 / 36

2. MFS (238)

95 / 5

2. Fidelity (1,075)

6 / 11

3. SEI (392)

86 / 14

3. Capital Group (175)

3 / 97

4. Mainstay (126)

85 / 15

4. BlackRock (1,257)

1 / 98

5. Morgan Stanley (114)

83 / 17

5. T Rowe Price (457)

2 / 98

6. Wells Fargo (225)

83 / 17

6. JPMorgan (392)

3 / 97

7. Columbia Funds (318)

58 / 42

7. State Street (396)

39 / 32

8. John Hancock (401)

56 / 42

8. Allianz (306)

38 / 62

9. Charles Schwab (438)

55 / 45

9. Columbia Funds (318)

58 / 42

10. Legg Mason (136)

51 / 49

10. Dimensional (368)

11. Janus (194)

44 / 6

11. Goldman Sachs (165)

18 / 75

12. State Street (396)

39 / 32

12. Federated Investors (102)

15 / 85

13. Allianz (306)

38 / 62

13. Dreyfus (170)

14. AXA (727)

37 / 60

14. Wells Fargo (225)

83 / 17

15. TIAA (494)

36 / 62

15. Invesco Funds (547)

36 / 61

16. Invesco Funds (547)

36 / 61

16. MFS (238)

95 / 5

17. Prudential (525)

19 / 50

17. Charles Schwab (438)

55 / 45

18. Goldman Sachs (165)

18 / 75

18. John Hancock (401)

56 / 42

19. Northern Trust (108)

15 / 85

19. Prudential (525)

19 / 50

20. Federated Investors (102)

15 / 85

20. Jackson National (235)

5 / 95

21. Fidelity (1,075)

6 / 11

21. Morgan Stanley (114)

83 / 17

22. Jackson National (235)

5 / 95

22. Legg Mason (136)

51 / 49

23. Capital Group (175)

3 / 97

23. Northern Trust (108)

15 / 85

24. JPMorgan (392)

3 / 97

24. AXA (727)

37 / 60

25. T Rowe Price (457)

2 / 98

25. TIAA (494)

36 / 62

26. BlackRock (1,257)

1 / 98

26. Mainstay (126)

85 / 15

27. Vanguard (1,028)

0 / 36

27. SEI (392)

86 / 14

28. Dimensional (368)

0 /100

28. Deutsche (278)

28. Dreyfus (170)

0 /100

29. Putnam (331)

28. Putnam (331)

0 /100

30. Janus (194)
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Table A.2: Selected Results from Bannon Communications Poll, 2010
“Please tell me whether you STRONGLY FAVOR, FAVOR, OPPOSE, or
STRONGLY OPPOSE each of the following resolutions [Rotate Order].”
… “(B) A requirement that shareholders in a company approve all corporate political
spending before the money is spent.”
Total
Favor
71%

Total
Oppose
23%

Don't
Know
6%

Strongly
Favor
40%

Strongly
Oppose
8%

Female <35

74%

21%

4%

34%

5%

Female 35-55

77%

19%

5%

44%

9%

Female 55 +

73%

18%

9%

46%

6%

Male 35

69%

27%

4%

36%

6%

Male 35-55

68%

28%

4%

34%

16%

Male 55 +

67%

25%

8%

42%

8%

All

… “(D) A requirement that companies must publicly disclose political expenditures to
other groups that spend money on politics like the Chamber of Commerce.”
Total
Favor

Total
Oppose

Don't
Know

Strongly
Favor

Strongly
Oppose

All

77%

18%

6%

45%

7%

Female <35

70%

22%

8%

33%

7%

Female 35-55

84%

11%

5%

53%

5%

Female 55 +

79%

15%

6%

44%

6%

Male 35

76%

22%

3%

46%

9%

Male 35-55

76%

19%

5%

47%

8%

Male 55 +

73%

20%

6%

46%

8%

36

Social Responsibility Resolutions

Table A.3: Selected Results from SurveyUSA Poll, 2010
“Should a publicly traded corporation get shareholder approval before the corporation
spends money to support or oppose a candidate for elected office? Or, is shareholder
approval not necessary? [Answer Choices Rotated]”
Should Get Approval

Not Necessary

Not sure

All

75%

13%

12%

Male

72%

15%

13%

Female

78%

12%

10%

18-34

70%

11%

20%

35-49

71%

18%

10%

50-64

83%

12%

5%

65+

79%

12%

8%

18-49

70%

14%

15%

50+

81%

12%

6%

Republican

79%

14%

7%

Democrat

74%

11%

15%

Independent

75%

15%

11%

Income <$50,000

70%

12%

18%

Income >$50,000

81%

14%

5%

Northeast

63%

17%

20%

Midwest

78%

13%

9%

South

79%

13%

8%

West

76%

11%

13%
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